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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal presents several questions concerning the District Court's findings that the

State's agents are immune from liability arising from the killing of 43 domestic elk by both private
and state hunters that was authorized by an executive order issued by the Governor after those
animals had escaped from a private elk ranch belonging to the Rammell Appellants.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This action was originally commenced in 7th District Court, Fremont County by the

Plaintiff/Appellants, Rex and Lynda Rammell ("the Rammells"), to obtain compensation from the
State of Idaho, James E. Risch and Steven Huffaker, arising from the alleged loss and destruction
of escaped domestic elk owned by the Rammells. The lawsuit was based upon actions taken by
those State agents in August and September 2006 in response to the escape of those animals from
the Rammells' domestic elk ranch in Fremont County Idaho. (R., pp. 15-54). Venue was later
changed to Ada County. (R., pp. 11-14).
The original Complaint contained eight counts, consisting of two tort claims, two
constitutional claims, and four § 1983 claims. On January 27, 2009 the State filed a motion to
dismiss on the basis that it had immunity from all claims made by the Rammells. (R., pp. 55-56).
On April 29, 2009, the District Court issued its Order Re: Motion to Dismiss which granted
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the State's motion to dismiss on six of the eight counts included in the original complaint. (R., pp.
106-128). The six dismissed counts included the four 42 U.S.c. § 1983 claims on the basis of
qualified immunity, and the two tort claims on the basis of statutory immunities to those tort claims.
The two claims that were not dismissed had alleged constitutional due process and "takings" claims,
on which the district court held that there were issues remaining in the case that

not

determined on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
On October 30, 2009 the Rammells filed a motion to file an amended complaint, which was
granted after a hearing held on November 12,2009. (Nov., 12,2009 Tr.) The Rammells' First
Amended Complaint was filed on November 25,2009 and the State defendants answered that First
Amended Complaint on January 7,2010. (R., 146-181).
The Rammells' First Amended Complaint contained seven counts consisting of the two
constitutional claims that had not been dismissed in their original Complaint and five § 1983 claims.
The two constitutional claims alleged the taking of property without due process, and an equal
protection claim. The five § 1983 claims included: (1) violation of substantive due process, (2) the
taking of property without due process, (3) an equal protection claim, (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and (5) negligence infliction of emotional distress. (R., pp. I
The Rammells did not include any allegations on the face of their First

Complaint,

or as were further supported by any facts that were revealed in discovery, that ultimately altered the
District Court's initial determination that the Rammells' § 1983 claims were barred by qualified
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immunity. Consequently, in response to the State's motion for summary judgment Counts ill, IV,
V, VI, & VII of the Rammells' First Amended Complaint were dismissed in their entirety on the
basis of qualified immunity to § 1983 liability. (Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 40, L. 25 to pg. 41, L. 1; R.,
pp.474-75). The district court also found that there was no factual basis in support of the Rammells'
Count II constitutional equal protection claim, and it also was dismissed. (Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 50,
LL. 9-16).
As to the Rammells' sole remaining claim, the Count I "takings" claim, the District Court
held that, "the state did not violate the takings clause or due process clause of either the state or
federal constitution or of the eminent domain clause of the state constitution." (Dec. ] 6, 1010 Tr.,
pg. 42, L. 22 to pg. 43, L. 1). Summary judgment was then entered dismissing the Rammells entire
First Amended Complaint. (R., pp. 474-75).
After the award of costs, and attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117 to the State, (R., pp. 676-689),
this appeal followed (R., pp. 660-668).
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Monday August 14,2006, Dr. Debra Lawrence, an assistant state veterinarian, contacted

the Rammells and informed them that approximately 100 head of domestic elk had been reported
in the vicinity of the Rammell elk ranch on the property of Carol Albertson. (First Amended
Complaint, q[ 10; R., pg. 148). The Rammells' home in Rexburg was about an hour away by car
from the location of their Fremont County elk ranch. (Rex Rammell Depo., pg. 36, LL. 19-2]; R.,
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pg. 191). Upon arriving at the elk ranch, the Rammells immediately determined that these escaped
elk belonged to them (First Amended Complaint, q[ 11; R., pg. 148).
Ultimately, this situation involved approximately 135 head of domestic elk that had allegedly
escaped from the Rammells' domestic elk ranch. As set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the
Rammells' First Amended Complaint (R., pg. 150), this number breaks down as follows:
Escaped domestic elk recaptured and segregated:
Escaped domestic elk documented as killed by hunters:
Escaped domestic elk unaccounted for:

61
43
31

Over an ensuing two and 1/2 week period between the initial report that was made on August
14 and August 31, the Rammells alleged that they and their friends were able to recapture
"approximately" 40 head of elk. (First Amended Complaint, q[ 12; R., pg. 149). At the end of this
two and 1/2 week period, near the first of September, it is alleged that representatives of the state of
Idaho suggested "graining" to the Rammells as a potentially "fruitful technique" in rounding up the
remaining escaped elk. (First Amended Complaint q[ 14; R., pg. 149). The Rammells were able to
recapture approximately another 21 head of their domestic elk for a total number of recaptured
domestic elk of about 61. (First Amended Complaint q[ 21; R., pg. 150).
Dr. Rammel1, who is a licensed veterinarian, testified at his deposition as to three different
strategies that were used in his attempt to recapture the escaped elk. (Rex Rammell Depo., pg. 68,
LL. 15-17; R., pg 197). First, he attempted to drive the elk back into the facility. (Rex Rammell
Depo., pg. 51, L. 8 to pg. 55, L. 9; R., pp. 193-94; pg. 60, LL. 3-10; R., pg. 195). Second, he set up
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three separate "capture pens."

(Rex Rammell Dep., pg. 57, L. 7, to pg. 60, L. 22; R., pg. 195).

Finally a "trap" set-up was used in which the elk were lured back into the facility. (Rex Rammell
Depo., pg. 60, L. 23 to pg. 62, L. 11; R., pg. 195-96). All efforts at recapturing any of the escape elk
ended by mid-October 2006. (Rex Rammell Dep., pg. 63, L. 25 to pg. 64, L. 4; R., pg. 196). During
the midst of all this, Rex Rammell had back surgery (Rex Rammell Depo, pg. 27, LL. 13-19; pg. 29,
LL. 2-5; R., pg. 189-190), but that surgery only interfered with his activities in attempting to
recapture the animals for three days. (Rex Rammell Depo., pg. 69, LL. 2-5; LL. 18-20; R., pg. ] 98).
Dr. Rammell testified at his deposition that the hole in the fence through which his elk
escaped probably had been caused by a bear. (Rex Rammell Depo., pg. 75, LL. 4-18; R., pg. 199).
He also testified that this hole was too small for the trophy elk with large antlers to pass through, so
that those animals which were scheduled to be hunted by his clients never escaped. (Rex Rammell
Depo., pg. 71, LL. 1-6; pg. 73, LL. 9-22; R., pg. 198-99).
Dr. Rammell also testified that he tried to schedule 30 to 40 hunts per year. (Rex Rammell
Depo., pg. 80, LL. 19-22; R., pg. 200). Notwithstanding the escape that occurred in August 2006,
Dr. Rammell could not recall that any contracts for hunts were cancelled in 2006. (Rex Rammell
Depo., pg. 103, LL. 15-17; R., pg. 201). Dr. Rammell also testified that prior to the events in
question he had made a decision to the sell the property, in part, because he had to haul all of the
water needed by the elk to that property. (Rex Rammell Depo., pg. 37, LL. 1-23; R., pg. 192).
On or about Thursday September 7, 2006, Idaho Governor James Risch signed an executive
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order (R, pp. 32-33) that allowed the Idaho Departments of Fish & Game and Agriculture to
"identify" and then "shoot on site" all of the escaped elk that remained at large (First Amended
Complaint, <[<[ 15 & 18; R, pp. 149-150). According to the Rammells, they received notification of
this executive order on Friday September 8, 2006 and the "hunt" for the remaining escaped domestic
elk actually began on Saturday September 9,2006. By the following Monday September 11,2006,
"the firs of a total of forty-three (43) elk were reported to have been killed." (First Amended
Complaint,

<[~[

18-20; R, pg. 150). The Rammells allege that around that time period they had

recaptured a total of61 (45%) of the approximately 135 elk that escaped from their ranch on or about
August 14,2006. (First Amended Complaint, 99 20-21; R, p. 150).

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court applies the same

standard as that which was applied by the District Court in granting summary judgment. Mackay
v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408,410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
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II.
RESPONDENTS' RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT
HA VE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT
AND THE RESPONDENTS' REQUEST FOR AN A \V ARD 0 F
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Governor have the legal authority to order that the Rammells' escaped domestic elk
be killed and taken without the payment of just compensation?

2.

Whether any issue of what constitutes a "reasonable" period of
to
recapture of escaped domestic elk, as determined by the administrator, was
rendered moot as a result of the governor's exercise of his executive
authority?

3.

Whether the State was entitled to take the Rammells' escaped domestic
payment of just compensation?

4.

Whether there was any question of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment for the
State on the basis of qualified immunity on the Rammells' 42 U.s.c. § 1983 claims?

5.

Did the District Court err in its award of attorney's fees to the State under I.c. § 12-117 on
the basis that the Rammells brought and pursued all of their claims without any basis in law
or fact?

6.

Are the Rammells entitled to have this Court disqualify the District Court judge if this case
is remanded?

7.

Is the State entitled to an award of attorney's fees under I.c. § 12-117 for the Rammells'
pursuit of this appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact?

without the

III.
ARGUMENT
This case was primarily decided below on issues of the State's immunity to liability.
Primarily, qualified immunity under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (Counts III through VII of the First Amended
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Complaint, R., pp. 154-160), and the immunity that is provided under the Idaho Tort Claims Act as
to the tort claims that had been alleged by the Rammells in their original complaint (Counts V & VI,
R., pp. 24-25).

As to immunity to the Rammells' constitutional "takings" claims, the right to abate a public
nuisance without the payment of compensation is well established in the law, Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); and State v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483,600 P.2d 787
(1979). But the issue in respect to Idaho's statutory immunity concerning the taking of escaped
domestic elk had not been addressed previously by an Idaho appellate court. It was that question
which occupied most of the time in the court below, both as to the construction of a specific statute,
I.e. § 25-3705A, and as to the immunity for any takings of the escaped domestic elk that occurred

as a result of the depredati on hunts that were authorized as a result of the exercise of the governor's
executive order authority in partial reliance upon the authority that was conferred by that statute.

A.

The Governor Properly Exercised His Authoritv In The Issuance Of the Executive
Order
The primary challenge that the Rammell Appellants have raised on this appeal is to the

District Court's grant of summary judgment on Count I of their First Amended Complaint (n 32-34,
R, pg. 153) in which they alleged a constitutional deprivation of their property without due process
of law. After the District Court had dismissed the Rammell Appellants' original § 1983 claims
(Counts III, IV, VII & VIII) on the basis of qualified immunity (R., pp. 116-121), and had also
dismissed their tort claims (Counts V & VI) on the basis of the discretionary function (I.e. 6-904(1)),
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 13

and the interference with contract right (I.e. § 6-904(3) exceptions to the Idaho Tort Claims Act (R.,
pp. 121-127), the Rammells were then granted leave to amend their complaint so as to allow them
every conceivable opportunity to ascertain and state those facts necessary to sustain their alleged
claims against the State. (Nov. 12,2009 Tr., pp. 5-17).
The Rammell Appellants' First Amended Complaint contained seven counts. The five §
1983 claims were subsequently dismissed by the district court on the same qualified immunity basis
as those same § ] 983 claims had been dismissed as alleged in the Rammells' original complaint
(Dec. 16, 2010 Tr., pg. 39, L. 8 to pg. 41, LL. 1, 18-20). The Rammells' equal protection
constitutional claim (Count II, q[~[ 35-37, R., pg. 154) was found to be factually unsupported, and was
also dismissed, (Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 49, L., 3 to pg. 50, L. 16), leaving only Count I in the First
Amended Complaint remaining.
The District Court's decision in dismissing the single claim that the Rammells have
challenged on this appeal in Count I of their First Amended Complaint is set out at pp. 42-52 of the
December 16, 2010 Transcript. The essential findings of the district court in support of its grant of
the State's summary judgment motion are set out as follows:
The court finds that it [I.e. § 25-3705A] is constitutional, and, therefore, the state did
not violate the takings clause or due process clauses of either the state or the federal
constitution or of the eminent domain clause of the state constitution.
Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 42, L. 21, to pg. 43, L. 1 (bracketed reference added).
I also find that the state of Idaho has an interest in protecting its native
wildlife on behalf of all of its citizens from diseases and parasites, but in addition to
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maintaining the genetic purity of its wildlife, protecting its wildlife from competition
for forage and habitat and insuring that the native wildlife will not be captured or
added to captive herds. And vice-versa, that captive herds will not become part of
native wildlife. And both parties are aware that that's the Pacific Northwest Venison
Producers case, a 9th Circuit case, 1994 [20 F.3d 1008].
Dec. 16, 2010 Tr., pg. 44, LL. 5-16 (bracketed reference added).
Again, whether - - whether these animals ultimately were found to be
deceased [sic, "diseased"] is irrelevant. It's irrelevant. The reliance on this statute,
the reliance on the lack of disease after the fact determination that the destroyed elk
were not diseased - - and this is the real point. It's the escape that triggers the
allowance of the taking, not the disease. There are already provisions that deal with
disease. This is for a different purpose.
And the - - like I pointed out with counsel, the reason for not allowing the
escape is not simply for disease. That may be one potential reason, but it is not the
primary reason for requiring these animals to be fenced and for the owner to keep
them under control.
I find that because the legislature - -legislative actions in passing 25-3705A
and not - - and in not providing compensation are constitutionally proper under the
public nuisance doctrine. The statute itself is constitutional and it doesn't sound to
me like the Rammells really argue that it's not constitutional. They just argue about
what it means.
MR. FUREY: That's correct.
THE COURT: Okay. But I'm going to make a finding that it is
constitutional. And, therefore, the court is going to dismiss all cause of action based
on any takings claims, which would be Counts One and Two.
Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 47, L. 23 to pg. 49, L. 2 (bracketed reference added).
On this appeal, the Rammell Appellants have not directly challenged the District Court's
decision and holding, as set out immediately above, that the State's actions did not constitute an
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unconsti tutional taking of the Rammells' property without the payment of just compensation, or the
district court's finding that the "escape" of those animals from confinement itself was sufficient
justification for the State's actions.
Instead, the Rammells have renewed the argument that they made below, which the District
Court did not address. That argument is that Idaho's law, as written - both its statutes and
promulgated rules and regulations

simply did not allow the State to kill their escaped animals,

either by the direct action of the State's agents, or by the State-authorized depredation hunt that took
place under rules that were promulgated by the Idaho Department of Fish and Game; both being
actions that were authorized by the Governor's September 7, 2006 executive order. (R., pp. 444-54).
Consequently, much of the Rammells' argument, both as made below and as renewed on this
appeal, has simply missed the mark. h1 the State's initial memorandum that was submitted in
support of its motion to dismiss the Rammells' original Complaint, the State declared the authority
of the Governor to issue executive orders as authorized by Article IV, Section of 5 of the Idaho
Constitution, and by I.e. § 67-802. (R., pg. 70). No issue has previously emerged in this case, as
argued below, and no issue has been presented by the Rammells on this appeal, that has challenged
the authority of the Governor to exercise his executive order authority to see that the laws are
faithfully executed. On this essential question, the Rammells and the State have diverged as to both
the argument that the Rammells presented to the District Court below, and as to the argument that
the Rammells have now presented to this Court on appeal.
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The Rammells have previously argued to the District Court (R., pp. 380-95), and they now
argue to this Court on appeal (Appellant's Opening Brief at pp. 22-30), that the State simply had no
authority to kill to the Rammells' escaped domestic elk. The Rammells' argument is premised upon
a general application of Idaho's livestock laws to domestic cervidae, and upon a narrow
interpretation ofIdaho's statutes and regulations concerning escaped domestic cervidae.
The Rammells' argument on this essential aspect of their claim founders by application of
the truism that one should be careful not to lose sight of the forest because of all the trees. As is
readily apparent from the actual decision of the district court, as quoted above, the basis for the
exercise of the Governor's authority in making his decision to issue the executive order on
September 7,2006 was much broader than the mere abatement of an escape of domestic elk from
their required confinement.
The exercise of the Governor's authority is derived a number of sources, as indicated upon
the face of the executive order itself. (R, pp. 32-33). Among other concerns, the Governor relied
upon the need to protect Idaho's wildlife, the regulation and protection of domestic livestock
interests, the protection of the general public welfare including interests Idaho shares in common
with adjoining states and countries, the abatement of a public nuisance, in addition to the specific
issues related to this particular escape.
In respect to the Governor's exercise of his authority, as quoted above, the District Court
found I.e. § 25-3705A to be constitutional, which finding the Rammells have not challenged on this
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appeal. As also quoted above, the District Court upheld the legislative decision to not provide
compensation to be constitutionally proper under the public nuisance doctrine, another finding which
the Rammells have also not challenged on this appeal. As noted at the outset of this argument, this
public nuisance finding, standing alone, is sufficient to justify the taking of the Rammells' escaped
domestic elk without the payment of just compensation. The Governor in exercising his executive
order authority did expressly invoke the immunity provisions of I.e. § 2S-370SA (R., pg. 33).
In addition, nowhere in their appellate argument have the Rammells actually argued and
established that any of their domestic elk was actually killed by anyone who was not a licensed Idaho
hunter who was not entitled to the immunity afforded by I.e. § 2S-370SA(3), or that the state and
its agents were not entitled to the immunity provided by extension under this statute for such noncompensated takings that were made by licensed hunters.
In sum, the Rammells have failed to challenge on this appeal the broad findings that were
made by the District Court, which upheld the exercise of authority by the Governor in issuing the
executive order that resulted in the dismissal on summary judgment of the Rammells' constitutional
takings claims against the State. The mere fact that under different circumstances, or under the
exercise of authority by a different state official, a different outcome might be mandated, as has been
argued by the Rammells, provides no basis for a different result based upon the actual facts of this
appeal. Therefore, the decision of the District Court dismissing the Rammells' claims and granting
summary judgment to the State should be affirmed.
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B.

There is No Issue In This Case Concerning The Determination Of A "Reasonable
Time" By The Administrator Of The Division of Animal Industries To Accomplish
Recapture Of Escaped Domestic Elk
On the second issue that the Rammells have raised on this appeal, they have argued that the

District Court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed because a determination of what
constitutes a reasonable time in which the Rammells should have been allowed to recapture their
escaped domestic elk was never made by Dr. Greg Ledbetter, the administrator of the Division of
Animal Industries of the Idaho Department of Agriculture. On this basis, the Rammells have argued
that a genuine issue of material fact existed which precluded the entry of summary judgment because
the State, when it formulated the issue that it had presented to the District Court below, had stated
that the Rammells' failure to recapture escaped animals within a reasonable time had created a public
nuisance that the State was entitled to abate without the payment of just compensation.
At the outset of the State's response to this alleged issue, it bears noting that it is a
fundamental rule of appellate procedure that an appellate court will not review an alleged error on
appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling below that forms the basis for the assignment
of error that has been raised. Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658, 664, 249 P.3d 851, 857 (2011). The
State has consistently taken the position in this case that the seven day period established in LC. §
25-3705A(3), and the administrative regulations adopted thereunder, is the reasonable period of time
allowed for the recapture of escaped domestic elk before the State may act to take those animals
without the payment of compensation to the owner.
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The facts of this case indicate that the Governor waited about 26 days from the time the
escape of the Rammell elk was first reported on or about August 14, 2006 until he issued the
executive order that allowed those animals to be killed by both private and state hunters on
September 7, 2006. In respect to the immunity issues that have been at the heart of this action, the
fact that it was the Governor who exercised this discretion, and not the Administrator of the Division
of Animal Industries, Dr. Greg Ledbetter, has never been at issue in this case.
The fact that Dr. Ledbetter might have exercised that discretion differently than the Governor
is irrelevant to the issues that are before this court on this appeal. It was the Governor who acted,
not Dr. Ledbetter, and the authority of the Governor to act in this case has not been raised as an issue
on this appeal. The existence of a genuine issue of material fact dictating the reversal of summary
judgment is one upon which the outcome of the case might change. 0 'Guin v. Binghmn County, 139
Idaho 9, 13, 72 P.3d 849, 853 (2003). Because it was Governor Risch, not Dr. Greg Ledbetter, who
exercised his discretion, there is nothing in the hypothetical exercise of discretion by Dr. Greg
Ledbetter that has been raised by the Rammells on this appeal that would change the outcome of the
case below that would have affected the District Court's grant of summary judgment.
As already noted above, the Rammells have raised no issue on this appeal challenging the
authority of the Governor to issue that executive order.

Therefore, any question as to the

reasonableness of time in which Dr. Ledbetter might or might not have acted is nothing more than
a hypothetical question that does not raise any genuine issue of material fact upon which a reversal

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 20

of summary judgment can be granted.
C.

The State Can Deny Compensation To The Owner Of Escaped Domestic Elk That Are
Taken During A Depredation Hunt For The Purpose Of Abating A Public Nuisance
On their third issue, the Rammells do nothing more than cite the fact that the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides for the payment of compensation for the taking of
private property, and that the governor's executive order specifically authorized the "take" of the
Rammells' elk without the payment of any compensation. They make no other argument, nor cite
any other authority in support of overturning the District Court's summary judgment decision, or in
support of the proposition that the denial of compensation under the authority of I.C. § 25-3705A
violated the Fifth Amendment takings clause. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority
or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996).
Notwithstanding the fact that the Rammells have failed to provide argument, or to cite
authority in support of any argument for a Fifth Amendment taking, it does bear noting that they
have repeatedly cited I.e. § 25-3707 throughout their opening brief for the proposition that the
legislature has granted "absolute" ownership rights in domestic cervidae, which entitles them to
compensation for the State's alleged taking of their escaped animals. A similar statutory declaration
exists for Ratite Animals (cassowary, ostrich, emu and rhea) in I.e. § 25-3607, and for fur-bearing
animals in I.e. § 25-3007. The statute for fur-bearing animals uses the same qualifying parenthetical
phrase, "the same as domestic animals," as appears in the statute addressing domestic cervidae.
This declaration of the absolute ownership in domestic elk does not establish a perpetual or
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irrevocable ownership claim in the owner of these animals, but rather is provided only in order to
overcome the common law rule that a person could only obtain a "qualified" ownership of a wild
animal. Geerv. State of Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27, 16 S.Ct. 600,603-04,40 L.Ed. 793, 796
(1896)1 ("[H]e has a transient property in these animals usually called 'game' so long as they
continue within his liberty, ... but, the instant they depart into another liberty, this qualified property
ceases.

* * * A man can have no absolute permanent property in these, .... "); and State v. Koller,

122 Idaho 409,413,835 P.2d 644, 648 (1992) ("[O]wnership acquired in fish and game is not such
an ownership as one acquires in chattels or lands, but is merely a qualified ownership, .... "), citing
to Sherwood v. Stephens, 13 Idaho 399, 403-04, 90 P. 345,346-47 (1907). Idaho has previously
recognized this common law rule, and one of the most commonly-applied exceptions to that rule,
based upon an owners' "hot pursuit" of escaped wild animals. See, Kesler v. Jones, 50 Idaho 405,
296 P. 773 (1931).
In contrast to this common law rule in respect to wild animals, the more recently developed
common law, as adapted to the specific conditions ofthe western United States, accepts the fact that
domestic animals on the open range may wander and their whereabouts be unknown without the
consequent loss of ownership rights in those animals. See e.g., Stewart v. Hunter, 16 P. 876, 878
(Or. 1888) ("An animal turned upon a range, like the one referred to, and permitted to run at large,

Geer v. State ofConnecticut was subsequently overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322,99 S.Ct. 1727,60 L.Ed.2d 250 (,1979) on the basis that certain elements of the Geer
decision discriminated against interstate commerce, but the Hughes decision did not affect Geer's
statement of the common law rule of qualified ownership in wild animals for which it is cited here.
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would not be an estray because its owner was ignorant of its present whereabouts. The animal is
expected to roam about, under such circumstances, and its particular habitation be to him a mere
matter of conjecture.").

If the common law rule in respect to wild animals had not been changed by I.e. § 25-3707,
then arguably by application of that common law rule the Rammells could have lost all ownership
interest in those domestic elk at the moment of escape. 2 Thereafter, any person would have been
entitled to immediately take, or to reduce those animals to his own possession, in compliance with
state law without regard to any claim by the RammeIls, whose ownership claims would have been
deemed extinguished at the moment of escape. Such a result was upheld in respect to an escaped
domestic elk under Texas law in Wiley v. Baker, 597 S.W.2d 3,6 (Tex.App.l980) ("We therefore
hold that the trial court correctly applied the common law rule, holding that the elk regained its status
as an animal ferae naturae when it escaped from the game farm.").
This change in the common law represented by the enactment of I.e. § 25-3707 simply
allowed the Rammells to continue to assert their ownership claim to the animals after their escape,

2
An exception was recognized in the common law for those escaped wild animals that
have previously shown a disposition to return to the enclosure from which they have escaped. The
most significant example was that of bees, whose economic benefit required that they leave and
return to the hive. See, Law of Bees, 39 A.L.R. 352; See generally, Escape of Wild Animals From
Confine112ent as Affecting Property Rights, 52 A.L.R. 1061. The common law rule developed well
before issues involving the recovery of escaped animals from circuses, zoos, other traveling
menageries arose. Certainly it would be fair to assume that an elephant, lion, or gorilla that escapes
from such an enterprise in a modern city would not be considered to have regained its natural state
to be thereafter free from any claims of ownership by its captor. See e.g., E.A. Stephens & Co. v.
Albers, 256 P. 15, 16 (Colo. 1927).
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and to be entitled to the return of any animal that might be captured alive, if that animal had the
required identification tags establishing the Rammells' prior claim of ownership. But that statutory
change in the common law does not operate to make the Rammells' property interest perpetual or
to

D.

make the loss of that property interest absolutely compensable by the State.

The Rammells Have Presented No Facts, Nor Established Any Basis in Law, For
Overturning The District Court's Grant Of Summarv Judgment On Their § 1983
Claims As Based On Qualified Immunity
The Rammells have challenged the District Court's grant of summary judgment on their 42

U.S.c. § 1983 claims on the basis that the actions of the Governor in issuing the executive order
violated clearly established law and therefore were not subject to qualified immunity. The Rammells
have essentially tied this argument to their first argument made on this appeal, to the effect that I.e.
§ 25-3705A(3) is nothing more than a hunter-incidental-take statute that could not have provided a

reasonable legal basis for the issuance of the governor's executive order.
In support of this argument, the Rammells rely upon Jackson v. City of Pittsburg, 2010 WL
2347085 (N.D.Ca1.201O) in which that Court found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether police officers were entitled to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.e. 1983 based upon their
alleged belief in the legality of tasering a suspect four times in quick succession under the
circumstances in which they were confronted.
The District Court in this case recognized and applied the reasonable belief standard to the
Rammells' claims, and also acknowledged that qualified immunity applies, even if an official is
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ultimately found to have been mistaken in that reasonable belief:
Reasonableness in this context is an objective measure determined by
reference to clearly established law. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Ordinarily, once the
court concludes that a right was clearly established, an official is not entitled to
qualified immunity because a reasonably competent public official is charged with
knowing the law governing his conduct. Id. at 818-19. However, even if the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established right, a government official
is entitled to qualified immunity if he could have reasonably, but mistakenly,
believed that his conduct did not violate the right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205; Hunter
v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343,
34 I (1986». This accommodation for reasonable error exists to prevent officials
from erring always on the side of caution because they fear being sued. Hunter, 502
U.S. at 229.
Therefore, the Court finds Governor Risch and Director Huffaker are immune
unless their alleged actions violated clearly established law ....
(R., pg. 119).

In their original Complaint, the Rammells had alleged four counts based upon 42 U.S.C. §
1983. The District Court held: "In light of the State's interest in protecting its wildlife and Idaho
Code § 25-3705A(2) which permits "necessary action" to bring under control escaped domestic
cervidae, it would not have been clear to a reasonably competent official in Governor Risch's
position that his issuance of the executive order was unlawful. Therefore, the Rammells' § 1983
claims against Governor Risch are barred by qualified immunity. Likewise, Director Huffaker is
immune from the Rammells' § 1983 claims for his efforts to carry out the governor's order." CR.,
pp. 120-121).

In their First Amended Complaint, the Rammells stated four claims under 42 U.S.c. § 1983
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CR., pp. 154-160). The Rammells made their argument that the law simply did not authorize the
killing of their escaped domestic elk. (Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 33, LL. 20-23; pg. 34, LL. 13-22). The
District Court rejected these arguments, relying upon the broadly-stated purpose of state regulation
of domestic-cervidae ranching in Idaho (Dec. 16, 2010 Tr., pg. 34, L. 23 to pg. 37, L.I8), and
concluded as follows:
Therefore, unless the actions taken violate clearly established law, the state
official's action are immunized. And in this case I find that the reasonable person
objectively would have believed, regardless of whether it's true or not, that they had
authority to go forward with the actions that were authorized by Governor Risch. I
don't find that there's any - - that they took any action that violated clearly
established law. And, therefore, I'm going to grant Risch's and Huffaker's motion.
Dec. 16,2010 Tr., pg. 40, L. 16 tp pg. 41, L. l.
In the City of Pittsburg decision upon which the Rammells rely, the Appellant Jackson
"immediately folded up and fell face first to the sidewalk" after he was hit by the first taser. 2010
\VL 2347085 at * 2. He was then tased three more times in quick succession, each taser discharging
electricity for a five second cycle for a total of four taser hits. The California Court held that there
was a genuine issue of fact under the circumstances of that case as to the application of qualified
immunity to the acts of the officers based upon the reasonableness of their belief in the legality of
their actions in tasering Jackson so many times, in such quick succession, after he had folded up and
hit the sidewalk after the first taser hit. 2010 WL 2347085 at

* 6.

In contrast, the Governor's actions in reliance upon I.e. § 25-3705A were based on more than
a statute that merely immunized innocent hunters who may have happened upon an escaped domestic
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elk and shot that animal thinking it was wild, as the Rammells have argued. That statute expressly

referenced a taking that complied with Title 36 and the rules and proclamations of the Idaho fish and
game commission, a provision that would be unnecessary if its only purpose was to immunize an
innocent hunter. At no time during the entire course of this proceeding have the Rammells raised
an issue as to any taking of their animals having occurred by anyone other than a licensed hunter,
whether by a state agent or by a private hunter. In addition, that statute expressly provided for
immunity of the state and its agencies. Such a provision would be unnecessary if its only purpose
was to immunize an innocent hunter.
Ultimately, the question in respect to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, as the
District Court corrected stated, is not whether the official did or did not actually violate clearly
established law, but whether that official reasonably believed that his actions did not violate clearly
established law. (R., pg. 119). Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,869,252 P.3d 1274,
1287 (2011) ("[t]he qualified immunity standard 'gives ample room for mistaken judgments' by
protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. '" quoting from,

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224,229,112 S.Ct. 534, 537,116 L.Ed.2d 589,596 (1991) and Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-97,89 L.Ed.2d 271,278-79 (1986).

There are no prior Idaho appellate cases that have construed and applied I.c. § 25-3705A.
When the law remains undeveloped, or the applicable principles are too uncertain, then an official
should be granted qualified immunity if he could have reasonably, but mistakenly, believed that his
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conduct did not violate the right. Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 869, 252 P.3d 1274,
1287 (2011). Here, the record when considered in its entirety, supports the determination that the
District Court did not err in dismissing the Rammells' § 1983 claims on the basis of qualified
immunity.

E.

The A ward Of Attornev Fees Below Should Be Affirmed On The Basis That The
Rammells Pursued The Claims l\fade In Their Amended Complaint 'Without A
Reasonable Basis In Law or Fact
The District Court made a mandatory award of attorney fees to the State under Ie. § 1 117

on the basis that the Rammells had pursued their First Amended Complaint without a reasonable
basis in law or fact. ("[T]he Court finds that the State's request of $49,202.50 incurred after the
Rammells moved to file an Amended Complaint is reasonable." R., pg. 684). The district court's
award was based upon the following finding:
In the Court's Order regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, dated April
29,2009, the Rammells were clearly and unequivocally advised that no reasonable
basis in fact or law existed with respect to their claims against the State or the
individual defendants. In fact, even as to the "taking" claims against the State, the
Court put them on notice that under the public necessity doctrine, it was unlikely that
would survive. Then when the Rammells moved to amend their complaint and again
pursue claims against the State and against Risch and Huffaker, the Court clearly
cautioned them that they needed to have a factual basis or sound legal argument or
they would face the imposition of attorney fees.
In particular, once the Court had ruled on the motion to dismiss, the Amended
Complaint was clearly filed without any basis in law or fact. Moreover, while not
necessary, the Court specifically warned the Rammells that if they did not have any
evidence or legal basis to support their Amended Complaint with all of its
allegations, the Court would impost costs and fees.
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After reviewing the deposition material it is clear that despite the warning, the
Rammells continued to pursue those claims even though they knew they had no facts
to support their claims or legally viable claims. Based on I.e. § 12-117(2), it is not
necessary to find that their causes of action utterly failed.
R., pp. 681-82.

On this appeal, the Rammells have offered no argument and have cited no legal authority in
support of overturning the district court's award of attorney fees to the State under I.e. § 12-117.
A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. State v. Zichko, 129
Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966,970 (1996). Instead, the Rammells have simply asked this Court to
review the same alleged reasons that they submitted to the District Court for disallowing those fees,
as set for in the record on appeal at pp. 608-659. The State, in its response to the Rammells'
opposition to the award of attorney fees below, observed that the Rammells had utterly failed to
provide any argument or to state any basis for denying an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-117.
Instead, the Rammells' submission to the District Court appeared to be nothing more than a rant
against the District Court, and against the state's counsel, in which they aired perceived injustices
and alleged prejudicial acts, which were supposedly supported by numerous pages of accompanying
deposition testimony, none of which seemed to be particularly relevant to the attorney fee question
that was at issue. (R., pp. 608-659).
All of the Rammells' claims were dismissed on the State's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that there was no factual or legal basis for the Rammells' claims. (Dec. 16,2010 Tr.,
41, LL. 2-17; pg. 52, LL. 4-22). Therefore, the award of attorney fees to the State under I.e. § 12-
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117 should be upheld on appeal. Hoffer v. City of Boise, 151 Idaho 400,403,257 P.3d 1226, 1229
(2011) ("To be entitled to an award of fees under LC. § 12-117, the prevailing party must show that
'the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. "').

F.

The Question Of Reassignment On Remand Is Premature And Is Within The Province
Of The District Court On Remand
As their final issue on appeal, the Rammells ask that this case be reassigned on remand.

Although the record and the Rammells' briefing contains more than an ample supply of their
allegations concerning the alleged prejudice and bias of the district court, that record is devoid of any
motion either raising that issue, or any motion to disqualify the district judge, or that even points to
any adverse ruling below upon which this Court may act in its appellate capacity. If the Rammells
should obtain any relief on this appeal that would entitle them to a remand, then they have an
adequate remedy on this question before the court below, such as a motion under LR.C.P. 40(d)(1).

G.

The State Respondents Are Entitled To An Award of Costs, And An Award Of
Attorney Fees Under I.e. § 12-117, On Appeal
Should the State be the prevailing party on this appeal then it requests an award of its costs,

as provided by LA.R. 40, and an award of attorney fees as allowed by LA.R. 41, and as provided by
I.C. § 12-117(1).
An award of attorney fees on appeal under LC. § 12-117(1) is appropriate if the court finds
that the non-prevailing party pursued the appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. Nelson

v. Big Lost River 11'1'. Dist., 148 Idaho 157, 166,219 P.3d 804,813 (2009). The award of attorney
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fees under I.e. § 12-117(1) is mandatory if the court finds that the non-prevailing party pursued the
appeal without a reasonable basis in law or fact. University of Utah Hospital v. Ada County Board

ojCol1unissioners, 143 Idaho 808, 812,153 P.3d 1154,1158 (2007).
The Rammells stated six issues that they were raising on this appeal. By their own admission
their argument to this Court was substantially cannibalized (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7) from
the briefs that they had submitted to the district court, and in several instances they have simply
implored this Court's law clerks to examine those briefs to locate the authority needed to support the
arguments that they have made to this Court (Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 7 & 9).
On the Rammells' first, and primary argument made on this appeal, they have simply reframed the issue that had been posed by the District Court, and instead mainly focused their
argument on whether the statute at issue had authorized action by state officials whose actions are
not at issue on this appeal (Dr. Greg Ledbetter), instead of the state officials whose actions are at
issue on this appeal (Governor Risch and Director Huffaker).
As to the remaining five issues that the Rammells raised, they either went to matters on
which there was no adverse decision below, or on which they made only the barest or non-existent
argument on this appeal, in effect doing nothing more than asking this Court to second-guess the
decision of the District Court without actually challenging any factual finding made by that court,
or any application of the law that the District Court had made to those facts. In sum, the Rammells
have pursued this appeal - as they did these same issues before the district court
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without a

reasonable basis in law or fact, and therefore the State is entitled to an award of attorney fees on
appeal under I.e. § 12-117.
IV.

CONCLUSION
The decision and judgment of the District Court granting summary judgment to the State
Respondents should be affirmed.
The decision and judgment of the District Court awarding attorney's fees and costs to the
State Respondents should be affirmed.
This Court should award the State Respondents attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

Respectfully Submitted this

"20

day of October 2011.

Michael ~eIlY
Attorney or the Respondents
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